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## Soul as the problem of the humanitarian psychology

### Abstract

The article deals with the constructing of the scientific model of the human soul, its historical and ontogenetic origin. There is an opinion that humanitarian conception of the soul can only be created on the basement of chylomorphic model of Aristotle's nature. The article attempts to construct some phases of historical logic of the human soul as an alternative basis of its ontogenetic logic: the form of the matter, the form of the living body, the form of the forms. We suggest that the mechanism of self-formation in the material environment, introduced by synergy (I. Prigozhin), is a historical preimage of the constructive dialogue; it is a mechanism of ideal forms and space of soul creation in the social environment.

Key words: form, soul, chylomorphism, ontogenesis, constructive dialogue, ideal form, real form

### The soul of the human being as a historical phenomenon

Aristotle has modeled the role of soul cognition for the cognition of the nature: "... the soul cognition promotes the cognition of the truth, especially the cognition of the nature ..." [1, p. 371].

However, he noted also the unconditional difficulty of soul analysis: "... It is so difficult in every respect to get reliable information about soul ..." [1, p.371].

Since the soul has appeared in sight of antique thinkers, the part of a special determinant of wildlife has been assigned to it: "... Some thinkers claim that soul moves a body where it lives because it moves itself .... Probably, the soul moves animate being by means of some decision and thought ..." [1, page 381].

Such opinion has been justified by the fact that the reality (matter, body) was considered, as a rule, as chaos, which is inert, passive and unable for self-determination. Though, according to Losev A.F.: "... Aristotle does not describe such a matter, which was a shapeless heap of something. It is totally imbued with life and mind ..." [2, p. 355].

Antique thinkers have concluded that inanimate nature can gain the qualitative definiteness, and wildlife can have qualitatively appropriate way of existence not by itself, but due to special "organizing force". The "the organizing force" was understood differently by various thinkers.

Antique thinkers as "**spontaneous materialists**" (A.F. Losev) understood soul as a specific "internal reality", as an essence of "external reality" (for example, Democritus's atomic soul).

Antique thinkers as "**spontaneous idealists**" understood "the organizing force" as force significantly divergent from the reality. For them "the organizing force" acted as an *eidos*, **an idea, a form** (Plato).

Aristotle claimed that the soul, which differs from the reality of a body as its idea, is inside of the body, not out of it.

Aristotle's position was often criticized. For example, "... In fact, the subsequent history of science in most of the cases is a history of consecutive discrediting of Aristotle. .... " **all Aristotle's ideas are false** " ..." [3, p. 153].

Aristotle's comparison with Hitler acts as a deification of similar criticism: "... Aristotle, like Hitler, never told someone something what those would not believe in. There was no need

for experiences or devices to check his observations. Difficult mathematical calculations for getting results or mystical intuition for understanding the inner meaning were out of question .... Aristotle explained that the world is what all people know about it, exactly it is what they know about it ..." [3, p. 154].

The abuse of positivists covers the Aristotle's role, which is not understood by them. Aristotle as the humanitarian scientist considered the soul as a kernel of humanitarian psychology, the psychology, which did not pretend to be a natural science at all. However, the humanitarian model of soul can be created only within the Aristotelean concept of the nature as a whole organism. That is, "... the identity of an **eidōs and matter** ... is the reason that the **thing is an organism** ..." [2, p. 344]. In addition, here: "... The organism is such integrity of a thing with one or several parts where the integrity presents substantially. For Aristotle such integrity represents any separate **thing**, any **animate being**, any **historical era** and **the whole world in general** ..." [2, p. 319].

Therefore: "... all the variety of the material world is based on different ratios of an **eidōs (forms, or the ideas)** and **matters** in their **cause-and-target embodiment** ..." [2, p. 337]. The authors draw the conclusion: "... **thing** [any **animate being**; any **historical era**; **the whole world in general**. – V.A.] is ..., firstly, a **matter**, secondly, a **form**, thirdly, an **operating reason**, fourthly, a **certain expediency** .... But then: each thing is the **substantiated form** with **cause-and-target** purpose ..." [2, p.332].

The Aristotelean four-principle structure of a matter as the whole organism assumes a **form** as the integral component. It also participates in a historical process and consistently gains a new quality.

This assumption offers the prospect of creation of the humanitarian concept of the human (reasonable) soul, which is historically, appears from the initial pra-form, the self-formed matter (I. Prigozhin). Aristotle's statement supports our conclusion: "... what is the soul in general. That is: it is the essence of a form (logos); it is the essence of a body's life ..." [1, p. 395].

Aristotle concretizes a concept of soul: "... soul is the location of the forms, but not the whole soul, only the thinking part of the soul and it has the forms not in the reality, but in the possibility ..." [1, p.433]. In addition, the description of soul is concluded with well-known expression: "... Thus, the soul is something like a hand; a hand is a tool of tools and mind is a form of forms ..." [1, p.439].

It is important to note "... **reasonable soul** is **"the place for eidōses"** ..." [2, p.344]. Alternatively, form of forms (**eidōs of eidōses; idea of the ideas**).

### **The soul of the human being as a subject of education**

The most important problem of the person's education is a problem of origin of his soul. **The beginning of ontogenesis** is the main problem here.

In psychology, there is a tradition to consider the origin of mentality (and soul) as result of socio-cultural experience's appropriation. Mimesis (imitation) acts as the mechanism of appropriation.

Such point of view is typical for psychologists of different philosophical settings: Marxian L.S. Vygotsky, behaviorist B. Skinner, social psychologist A. Bandura, cultural and historical psychologist Michael Cole, social and reflex psychologist S.L. Rubenstein.

According to scientists, **the imitation** is a unique mechanism of mentality (and soul) initiation, which provides an interiorization of external socio-cultural form into internal ideal form.

However, there is a problem, which is not described in proper way, but L.S. Vygotsky has not ignored it, though as the cultural and historical psychologist could not solve it. That is the problem of **possibilities and limits** of the mechanism of imitation. It is possible to imitate when a possibility (ability) to imitate is already formed: "... the child can only imitate what is in a zone of his own intellectual possibilities..." [4, p. 248]. The idea of how the qualitatively new

possibilities and ability to imitate appear is a secret (it is impossible to take seriously the **organic maturing** as a pseudo-solution offered by Vygotsky).

According to chylomorphic concept of consciousness [5], the appropriation is possible only in that case when consciousness as a qualitative and definite correlation of ideal and real forms is already created. Then the external socio-cultural form adequate to internal ideal form can be appropriated.

Nevertheless, if the quality of socio-cultural form exceeds the quality of the ideal form generated by individual consciousness, then appropriation is impossible. It is confirmed by broad educational experience.

In this case, there is a need to change the individual consciousness as a way of generation of ideal forms. However, for this purpose it is not enough to include the pupil into cognitive communication in order to "transfer" a socio-cultural form. According to outstanding E.V. Ilyenkov Russian philosopher, the ideal form cannot be "transferred" at all: "... The person cannot transfer to another person the ideal as a pure form of activity ..." [6, P. 219-227].

Only the person can create the ideal form.

In order to change consciousness qualitatively and the ideal form generated by consciousness, it is necessary to change the relation between ideal and real forms. It is possible in the conditions of constructive dialogue only, when pupils need to solve a problem of designation and judgment of new reality.

In this case, the adult acts not as "transmitter", but as the organizer of designing process where children construct the values and meanings as "substratum" of ideal forms.

Constructive dialogue is the mechanism of self-formation in social reality with distant historical prototype of self-formation mechanism of matter revealed in synergy (I. Prigozhin).

Constructive dialogue is the universal mechanism of genesis of consciousness and ideal space of soul in ontogenesis.

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